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Abstract
We propose a model of an agent which is both logical and operational. Our
model of vivid agents takes into account that agents need not only the ability to
draw inferences but also to update their current knowledge state, to represent and
to perform (and to simulate the execution of) actions in order to generate and exe-
cute plans, and to react and interact in response to perception and communication
events. We illustrate our formalization of this basic functionality of an agent by
means of examples. We also show how our model ts into the transition system
semantics of concurrent reactive systems by identifying the ve basic transitions
of vivid agent systems: perception, reaction, planning, action, and replanning.
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1 Introduction
A vivid agent is a software-controlled system whose state is represented by a knowledge
base, and whose behavior is represented by means of action and reaction rules. Fol-
lowing [McC79, Sho93], the state of an agent is described in terms of mental qualities,
such as beliefs and intentions. The basic functionality of a vivid agent comprises a
knowledge system (including an update and an inference operation), and the capa-
bility to represent and perform actions in order to be able to generate and execute
plans. Since a vivid agent is `situated' in an environment with which it has to be able
to communicate, it also needs the ability to react in response to perception events,
and in response to communication events created by the communication acts of other
agents. We formalize the combination of these reactive and proactive aspects of agent
behavior by nondeterministic interleaving of perception, reaction, planning and plan
execution, resp. action. Notice that we make the important distinction between action
and reaction: actions are deliberatively planned in order to solve a task or to achieve a
goal, while reactions are triggered by perception and communication events. Reactions
may be immediate and independent from the current believe state of the agent but
they may also depend on the result of deliberation. In any case, they are triggered by
events which are not controlled by the agent.
Our theory of vivid agents is based on the internal or subjective view of the world
(inhabitated by them). This means that there is no need for a notion of objective time,
or for the distinction between knowledge and belief. In contrast, these concepts are
essential to external or objective theories of agents such as [CL90] or [F+95]. While our
subjective theory of agents corresponds to the programming point of view, objective
theories try to capture the perspective of an eternal, external and perfect observer of
the world, that is the perspective of God.
2
We do not assume a xed formal language and a xed logical system for the knowl-
edge base of an agent.
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Rather, we believe that it is more appropriate to choose a
suitable knowledge system for each agent individually according to its domain and its
tasks. In simple cases, a relational database-like system (admitting of atomic sentences
only) will do the job, while in more involved cases one may need the ability to process,
in addition to simple facts, (disjunctive or gradual) uncertain information, temporal
information, or even such advanced capabilities as deductive query answering and in-
consistency handling. The knowledge system of a vivid agent will be nonmonotonic,
since one needs the Closed-World Assumption, and negation-as-failure, in any practical
system. Notice that this departs from the use of standard logics (enriched by various
modal operators) which is common in many other logical approaches to agent mod-
eling. Vivid agents can be obtained by extending vivid knowledge systems through
the addition of action and reaction rules, i.e. one can `plug in' any suitable knowl-
edge system for constructing a specic agent system. Since our denition of action
and reaction rules applies to all kinds of knowledge systems, this makes vivid agents
scalable. Our rule-based approach to agent specication is more computational than
modal logic approaches based on possible worlds semantics because it refers to the
actual components of agent systems needed in programming and not to philosophical
abstractions.
The combination of a knowledge base with action and reaction rules yields an
executable specication of an agent, resp. of a multi-agent system. This is similar to
the idea of PROgramming in LOGic where programs have both a procedural and a
declarative reading. Our concept of vivid agents thus is able to narrow the gap between
agent theory and practical systems, a gap which seems to be insuperable in many other
logic-based approaches.
2 Knowledge Systems
The language of knowledge systems consists of the logical functors conjunction (^),
disjunction (_), negation (:), exclusive disjunction j, and the truth constant true;
predicate symbols such as p; q; r; : : :; constant symbols such as c; d; : : :; and variables
such as x; y; : : :. For simplicity, we shall not consider functional terms but only variables
and constants. An atom a is an atomic formula, it is called proper, if a 6= true. Literals
are either atoms or negated atoms, l = aj:a. We use a; b; : : :, l; k; : : :, and F;G;H; : : : as
metavariables for atoms, literals, and well-formed formulas, respectively. A variable-
free expression is called ground. The set of all proper atoms (literals) of a given
language is denoted by At (Lit). If F is a set of connectives, say F  ftrue;:;^;_; j;
;9;8; : : :g, then L(F) denotes the respective set of well-formed formulas. Where L is a
language (a set of formulas), L
0
denotes its restriction to closed formulas (sentences).
We use three specic languages: L
KB
is the set of all admissible knowledge bases of a
knowledge system,
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L
Query
is the query language, and L
Input
is the set of all admissible
1
It is important to recognize that for information and knowledge processing, unlike classical rst-
order logic for mathematics, there is no ONE TRUE LOGIC, but many dierent logical systems
accounting for dierent kinds of knowledge such as temporal, uncertain, condential, inconsistent,
disjunctive, deductive, active, etc.
2
It seems to be unrealistic to allow for arbitrary formulas in a KB for a number of reasons: a
KB concept has to be a conservative extension of that of relational databases; it has to provide for
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inputs, i.e. those formulas representing new information a KB may be updated with.
While the input language denes what the agent can be told (i.e. what it is able
to assimilate into its KB), the query language denes what the agent can be asked.
Elements of L
0
Query
, i.e. closed query formulas, are also called if-queries.
Denition 1 (Knowledge System) An abstract knowledge system K is a septu-
ple:
3
K = hL
KB
; `; L
Query
; Ans; L
Ans
; Upd; L
Input
i
where `  L
KB
 L
0
Query
is called inference relation, Ans : L
KB
 L
Query
! L
Ans
is
called answer operation, and Upd : L
KB
 L
0
Input
! L
KB
is called update operation,
satisfying for any X 2 L
KB
,
(KS1a) X ` true, and Upd(X; true) = X:
(KS1b) X ` F i Ans(X;F ) = yes:
(KS2) L
Input
 L
Query
:
(KS3) Upd(X;F ) ` F , for any F 2 L
0
Input
which is compatible with X.
In the sequel, we sometimes omit Ans and L
Ans
, and write a knowledge system simply
as a quintuple.
In many cases, it is useful to be able to update by a set of inputs and we therefore
`overload' the symbol Upd to denote also this more general update operation
Upd : L
KB
 2
L
0
Input
! L
KB
which has to be dened in such a way that for any nite A  L
0
Input
, Upd(X;A) =
Upd(X;
V
A).
We now present several examples of basic knowledge systems for agents. The
simplest one is the knowledge system of relational databases which requires complete
and consistent information about the predicates of the application domain, implying
that all information sources are absolutely reliable and honest.
2.1 Relational Databases
A nite set of ground atoms corresponds to a relational database. For instance, X
1
=
fr(S); r(P ); m(P;L)g, may represent the information that both Peter and Susan are
residents, and that Peter is married to Linda. As a kind of natural deduction from
positive facts an inference relation ` between a database X  At and an if-query is
dened in the following way:
(` a) X ` a if a 2 X
(` :a) X ` :a if a 62 X
negation-as-failure and for some kind of CWA mechanism; the amount of `disjunctiveness' of a KB
needs special care; there will be null values rather than existential quantiers; etc.
3
The formulation of a knowledge system in terms of query and input processing was already implicit
in [Bel77]. In [Lev84] it was proposed as a `functional approach to knowledge representation'. In
[Wag94, Wag95] the concept of knowledge systems was further extended and used as an integrating
framework for knowledge representation and logic programming.
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Compound if-queries, involving conjunction and disjunction, are handled in the stan-
dard way. Negated compound if-queries are treated by simplication according to the
DeMorgan rules and double negation elimination. Inference in relational databases
corresponds to preferential entailment based on minimal models. For instance, X
1
`
m(P;L)^:(r(P )^ r(L)). Because of its built-in general Closed-World Assumption, a
relational database X answers an if-query F by either yes or no:
Ans(X;F ) =
(
yes if X ` F
no otherwise
Updates are insertions, Upd(X; a) := X [ fag, and deletions, Upd(X;:a) := X   fag,
of atoms a 2 At. For a consistent set of literals E, we have Upd(X;E) = X[E
+
 E
 
,
where E
+
contains the positive, and E
 
contains the negative literals of E. For
instance,
Upd(X
1
;:m(P;L) ^m(P; S)) = fr(S); r(P ); m(P; S)g
describes a possible transaction. In the presence of integrity constraints IC  L
0
Query
,
updates must not violate any of them, and thus Upd(X;F ) is the knowledge base
closest to X satisfying both F and all G 2 IC.
The knowledge system of relational databases, denoted by A, is then dened as
A = h2
At
; `; L(:;^;_); Ans; fyes; nog; Upd; Liti
Knowledge systems extending A conservatively are called vivid. Positive vivid knowl-
edge systems use a general Closed-World Assumption, whereas general vivid knowledge
systems employ specic Closed-World Assumptions (and possibly two kinds of nega-
tion). For instance, A can be extended to a general vivid knowledge system, called
relational factbases, by allowing for literals instead of atoms as information units (see
below). Further important examples of positive vivid knowledge systems are tem-
poral, uncertain and disjunctive databases, which can be extended to corresponding
general vivid knowledge systems called temporal, uncertain and disjunctive factbases.
All these kinds of knowledge bases can be extended to deductive knowledge bases by
adding deduction rules of the form F  G (see [Wag95]).
2.2 Relational Factbases
A knowledge base consisting of a consistent set of ground literals (viewed as positive
and negative facts) is called a relational factbase. In a factbase, the CWA does not
in general apply to all predicates, and therefore in the case of a non-CWA predicate,
negative information is stored along with positive. This allows to represent predicates
for which the KB does not have complete information.
The schema of a factbase stipulates for which predicates the CWA applies by means
of a special set CWRel of relation symbols. For instance, the factbase
CWRel = frg
X
2
= fr(S); r(P ); s(S);:s(L);:s(P ); m(P;L); m(T; S)g
may represent the information that Susan and Peter are residents, Susan is a smoker,
Linda and Peter are nonsmokers, Peter is married to Linda, and Tom is married to
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Susan. Only the predicate resident is assumed to be completely represented, i.e. subject
to the CWA, since the local KB does not have complete information about smokers
and marriages while it has complete information about residents.
As a kind of natural deduction from positive and negative facts an inference relation
` between a factbase X  Lit and an if-query is dened in the following way:
(` a) X ` p(c) if p(c) 2 X
(` :) X ` :p(c) if :p(c) 2 X
(` CWA:) X ` :p(c) if p 2 CWRel & p(c) 62 X
Compound formulas are treated like in A. For instance, one may ask \who is married
with a nonsmoking non-resident ?", i.e. X
2
` m(x; y) ^ :s(y) ^ :r(y). An if-query F
is answered according to
Ans(X;F ) =
8
>
<
>
:
yes if X ` F
no if X ` :F
unknown otherwise
Updates are recency-preferring revisions:
Upd(X; p(c)) :=
(
X [ fp(c)g if p 2 CWRel
X   f:p(c)g [ fp(c)g otherwise
Upd(X;:p(c)) :=
(
X   fp(c)g if p 2 CWRel
X   fp(c)g [ f:p(c)g otherwise
The knowledge system of relational factbases, denoted by F , is dened as
F = h2
Lit
; `; L(:;^;_); Ans; fyes; no; unknowng; Upd; Liti
Inference in F corresponds to preferential entailment based on models which are min-
imal with respect to CWRel, or equivalently, to predicate circumscription [McC80].
2.3 Unreliable Information
In relational databases and factbases it is assumed that all information sources au-
thorized to enter new information into the knowledge base are completely reliable and
honest, and therefore new information always overrides old information (in relational
databases it is even assumed that all information suppliers have complete information).
In many domains, however, and especially in many agent scenarios, this assumption
is not realistic, and dierent sources of information have to be distinguished in terms
of authorization, reliability and honesty. While reliability concerns the frequency of
(unintended) errors, honesty is a matter of benevolence and truthfulness. The knowl-
edge system of source-labelled (SL-) factbases represents a principled approach to the
problem of reliability and honesty. Its main principles are:
1. A SL-factbase assigns reliability degrees (s) 2 [ 1; 1] to its information sources
s. Complete reliability is expressed by (s) = 1, or (s) =  1. If (s) = 0,
the source s is completely unreliable, and hence completely uninformative. If
(s) < 0, the source s is not honest, and (s) =  1 means that s always lies.
Reliability degrees correspond to possibilistic certainty values, see [Wag96c]. For
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a completely reliable piece of information l, the source s is not recorded together
with l since this is unnecessary. Instead, l is assimilated into the SL-factbase like
in relational factbases. An unreliable piece of information l is recorded together
with its source s as l:s.
2. Information about Closed-World predicates is only accepted from completely
reliable sources, i.e. if p 2 CWRel ,
Upd(X; p(c):s) =
8
>
<
>
:
X [ fp(c)g if (s) = 1
X   fp(c)g if (s) =  1
X otherwise
3. If the information source is qualied as completely reliable, it leads to recency-
preferring revision:
Upd(X; l:s) =
(
X   f
~
lg [ flg if (s) = 1
X   flg [ f
~
lg if (s) =  1
where l = aj:a stands for a literal, and
~
l denotes its complement.
4. More reliable information overrides less reliable:
Upd(X; l:s) =
(
X   fl:s
0
;
~
l:s
0
g [ fl:sg if l:s
0
2 X or
~
l:s
0
2 X, and j(s)j > j(s
0
)j
X if l:s
0
2 X or
~
l:s
0
2 X, and j(s)j < j(s
0
)j
5. New information from the same honest source as the old one leads to a recency-
preferring revision, while old information from a liar is preferred to new infor-
mation from the same liar:
Upd(X; l:s) =
(
X   f
~
l:sg [ fl:sg if
~
l:s 2 X and (s) > 0
X if
~
l:s 2 X and (s) < 0
6. If new information contradicts old one and stems from a dierent source with
the same degree of reliability, this leads to mutual neutralization:
Upd(X; l:s) = X [ fl:sg
if
~
l:s
0
2 X and (s
0
) = (s), or l:s
0
2 X and (s
0
) =  (s).
An answer to an if-query is either yes, no, or unknown, or an uncertainty-qualied yes,
no, or yes-and-no. For Closed-World predicates p 2 CWRel ,
Ans(X; p(c)) =
(
yes if p(c) 2 X
no otherwise
Ans(X;:p(c)) =
(
yes if p(c) 62 X
no otherwise
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For non-CWA predicates,
Ans(X; l) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
yes if l 2 X
no if
~
l 2 X
unknown if l:s 62 X &
~
l:s 62 X
yes : (s) if l:s 2 X &
~
l:s
0
62 X
no : (s) if
~
l:s 2 X & l:s
0
62 X
yes-and-no : (s) if l:s 2 X &
~
l:s
0
2 X
Below, in section 4.4, we will present an example of processing unreliable information.
3 Action Rules
Action rules have the general form of Action  Condition .
4
We distinguish between
action and reaction rules. While action rules can be used to represent the elementary
action types of an agent, and to generate and execute plans, thus determining the
proactive behavior, reaction rules are used to specify the reactive behavior of an agent.
Depending on the resp. domain and the capabilities and tasks of an agent, only
certain actions can be performed by it. We distinguish between epistemic, physical
and communicative actions. Epistemic actions only change the beliefs of an agent.
Physical actions change the environment, but they may also lead to a corresponding
belief change if the agent is aware of their epistemic eects and if their recording is
relevant to its operation. A physical action is therefore represented by a procedure call
(aecting the available actuators) and an epistemic eect formula. Communicative
actions may change the beliefs of all involved agents. They are realized by means of
asynchronous message passing via the available communication links (either audio or
radio links in the case of robots, or network links in the case of embedded systems and
software agents).
Action rules combine declarative queries (or inference) with state change (or up-
date). Since in general, the eects of an action may be context-dependent, an action
is represented by a set of action rules expressing the dependence of dierent eects
on dierent preconditions. The execution of an action in a situation described by the
knowledge baseX is realized by ring the corresponding action rule whose precondition
Cond holds in X, i.e. X ` Cond .
3.1 Epistemic Action Rules
Epistemic action rules have the form
r : E  Cond
where E 2 L
Input
, and Cond 2 L
Query
, are logical formulas expressing an epistemic
eect and a precondition, and r is the name of the action rule. We require that Cond
is an evaluable formula and that all free variables of E also occur in Cond.
5
4
Certain forms of action rules were proposed under the name of `production rules' in expert systems,
and under the name of `event-condition-action' rules as an extension of databases, now called active
databases, see e.g. [McCD89].
5
Rules of this form, where all free variables of the conclusion occur in the premise, and the premise
is evaluable, are called range-restricted. In the sequel, we assume that rules are always range-restricted.
See [vGT91] for the notion of evaluable or domain-independent formulas.
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Denition 2 (Rule Application) An epistemic action rule r : E  C represents
an update function, i.e. a mapping r : L
KB
! L
KB
, with
r(X) := Upd(X; fE :  is a substitution s.th. X ` Cg)
Notice that in the case of a non-applicable rule, we get (by denition, resp. convention)
r(X) = Upd(X; ;) = Upd(X;
^
;) = Upd(X; true) = X
Also, if a rule r : E  C does not have free variables, then
r(X) =
(
Upd(X;E) if X ` C
X otherwise
If a rule r : E  C has free variables, say Free(C) = fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g, then we also write
its name as the expression r(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) in order to be able to refer to specic instan-
tiations of it by means of r(c
1
; : : : ; c
n
) where the free variables x
i
in r are substituted
by constants c
i
.
Example 1 Referring to the database X
1
from 2.1, we consider the epistemic action
rule
r
1
: r(y) (m(x; y) _m(y; x)) ^ r(x)
expressing the fact that everyone getting married with a resident becomes also a resi-
dent. Applying it to X
1
yields
r
1
(X
1
) = X
1
[ fr(L); r(T )g
since (m(x; y) _ m(y; x)) ^ r(x) can be inferred from X
1
with the two substitutions
fx=P; y=Lg and fx=S; y=Tg. Alternatively, we could obtain the same result by succes-
sively applying the two ground instances r
1
((P;L) and r
1
(S; T ) of r
1
(x; y) to X
1
:
r
1
(X
1
) = r
1
(P;L)  r
1
(S; T )(X
1
) = r
1
(P;L)(r
1
(S; T )(X
1
))
3.2 Physical and Communicative Action Rules
Physical action rules have the form
r : do(); E  Cond
while communicative action rules have the form
r : sendMsg[;R]; E  Cond
where E 2 L
Input
, and Cond 2 L
Query
, are logical formulas expressing the epistemic
eects, resp. precondition, of the action; do() calls procedure  2 L
Act
aecting
some actuators available to the agent; sendMsg[;R] is a procedure call to execute
the communication act  from the communication event language L
CEvt
such that R
identies the receiver of the outgoing message ; and r is the name of the resp. action
rule. We assume that a communication act sendMsg[;R] is realized by asynchronous
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message passing through perfect channels, but abstract away from the channel in our
formal treatment below.
6
When we are only interested in the epistemic representation of an action we omit
the execution command do(), resp. sendMsg[;R], in the action rule r, thus obtaining
its epistemic projection _r. The execution of an action which is represented by the action
rule r in a situation described by a knowledge base X corresponds on the epistemic
level to the application of _r to the current knowledge state X, and yields the updated
knowledge state _r(X).
Example 2 (Elevator Actions) In an elevator scenario, we may have the ele-
mentary actions of going one oor up, or one oor down, i.e. L
Act
= foneup; onedowng,
represented by the action rules
r
u
: do(oneup); at(x+ 1) ^  at(x)  at(x) ^ x < topfloor
r
d
: do(onedown); at(x  1) ^  at(x)  at(x) ^ x > 0
Let the current situation, where the elevator is halting at the 3rd oor, be described by
X
0
= fat(3)g, and let topoor = 10. Then, performing the action oneup corresponds
to the rule application
_r
u
(X
0
) = _r
u
(3)(X
0
) = X
0
  fat(3)g [ fat(4)g = fat(4)g
In this example, it is assumed that the action of moving one oor upwards is immediate,
i.e. without duration. In a more realistic modeling, such as the one below, one would
rather dene the action of starting to move upwards.
4 Reaction and Interaction Rules
Reaction rules encode the behavior of an agent in response to perception events cre-
ated by the agent's perception subsystems, and to communication events created by
communication acts of other agents. We distinguish between epistemic, physical and
communicative reaction rules, and call the latter interaction rules. L
PEvt
and L
CEvt
denote the perception and communication event languages, and L
Evt
= L
PEvt
[L
CEvt
.
The following table describes the dierent reaction rule formats:
epistemic E  recvMsg["; S]; Cond
physical do(); E  recvMsg["; S]; Cond
communicative sendMsg[;R]; E  recvMsg["; S]; Cond
where " 2 L
Evt
represents a perception or a communication event created by some
perception subsystem of the agent or by another agent identied by S, and thus the
event condition recvMsg["; S] is a test whether the event queue of the agent contains the
message " sent by S. Both perception and communication events will be represented
by incoming messages.
7
6
We assume that communication channels are perfect in the sense that no message gets lost, and
all messages are received in the order they have been sent.
7
In a robot, for instance, appropriate perception subsystems, operating concurrently, will continu-
ously monitor the environment and interpret the sensory input. If they detect a relevant event pattern
in the data, they report it to the knowledge system of the robot in the form of a perception event
message.
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In general, reactions are based both on perception and on knowledge. Immediate
reactions do not allow for deliberation. They are represented by rules with an empty
epistemic premise, i.e. Cond = true. Timely reactions can be achieved by guaranteeing
fast response times for checking the precondition of a reaction rule. This will be the
case, for instance, if the precondition can be checked by simple table look-up (such as
in relational databases and factbases). It will be more dicult in knowledge systems
with deduction rules (e.g. deductive databases).
Notice that we identify a communication act with the corresponding communication
event which is perceived by the addressee of the communication act.Typically, the set
of possible communication acts includes telling, asking, replying, and more. As noted
in [Pei76], dierent communication acts (also called `speech acts' in the literature) may
have the same propositional content:
One and the same proposition may be armed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly
inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, eectively commanded, taught,
or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a dierent proposition.
4.1 Example: An Elevator as a Reagent
In order to describe an elevator as a purely reactive agent we use three action types:
L
Act
= fmvup;mvdown ; haltg; and two perception event types: L
PEvt
= freqTo(x); arrAt (x)g.
Since there is no need for inter-agent communication, L
CEvt
= ;. Whenever the el-
evator, while moving up or down, arrives at some oor k, this is signalled by the
environment as the perception event arrAt(k). Whenever the elevator is requested to
serve oor k, signalled by the event reqTo(k), this will be recorded in the KB by means
of the uent req(k). The state of the elevator is described by means of the uents at(x),
up(x), and down(x), i.e. predicates representing the information that the elevator is
currently halting at oor x, moving upwards from oor x, or moving downwards from
oor x.
The behavior of the elevator can be specied by means of the following reaction
rules:
r
1
: do(mvup); req(x) ^ :at(y) ^ up(y)
 recvMsg[reqTo(x)]; at(y) ^ x > y ^ x < topfloor
r
2
: do(mvdown); req(x) ^ :at(y) ^ down(y)
 recvMsg[reqTo(x)]; at(y) ^ x < y ^ x > 0
r
3
: up(x) ^ :up(x  1)
 recvMsg[arrAt(x)]; req(y) ^ x < y ^ x < topfloor
r
4
: down(x) ^ :down(x+ 1)
 recvMsg[arrAt(x)]; req(y) ^ y < x ^ x > 0
r
5
: do(halt); at(x) ^ :req(x) ^ :up(x  1) ^ :down(x+ 1)
 recvMsg[arrAt(x)]; req(x)
Notice that for this simple elevator system we do not have to distinguish between the
request made by pushing the button in the elevator in order to move it to the target
oor, and the request made by someone waiting for the elevator to come to his oor.
In both cases, since this type of elevator has no recording facility, requests are only
accepted if the elevator is currently halting at some oor. Notice also that the behavior
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of the elevator does not depend on its knowledge about moving up or down because
it completely relies on the signals arrAt(x) from the environment. We have included
the up and down information in the epistemic eects of the reaction rules, however, in
order to be able to prove below the correctness of this specication which requires to
make the interaction with the environment explicit.
Assuming the initial situation X
0
= fat(3)g and an incoming request from the fth
oor, i.e. recvMsg[reqTo(5)], we get in the rst step
X
1
= _r
1
(X
0
) = freq(5); up(3)g
and the elevator is moving upwards. When it arrives at the fourth oor, arrAt(4) is
signalled, and the reaction rule r
3
, causing the continuation of moving up, is applicable
X
2
= _r
3
(freq(5); up(3)g) = freq(5); up(4)g
Finally, the fth oor is reached, i.e. recvMsg[arrAt(5)] holds, and r
5
is applicable:
X
3
= _r
5
(freq(5); up(4)g) = fat(5)g
4.2 Verifying the Elevator Specication
We might want to prove that the elevator specication is correct in the sense that
every service request when the elevator is idle will be served. This means that we have
to show that for any k and any m with 0  k;m  topfloor, the event reqTo(k) leads
to at(k), if at(m) holds. The latter condition requires that the elevator must currently
be halting, i.e. idle, at some oor. Let X
0
= fat(m)g, and let recvMsg[reqTo(k)]
hold. Since the assertion holds trivially for k = m we may assume that k 6= m.
Thus, in the rst step either r
1
or r
2
is triggered yielding either of the states X
1
=
freq(k); up(m)g, or X
1
= freq(k); down(m)g. It suces, therefore, to prove that
whenever req(k)^ (up(m)_down(m)) holds, this leads (in nite time) to a state where
at(k) holds.
We assume that the environment behaves reasonably, i.e. that whenever the elevator
is moving up or down, after some time it will receive the signal (in the form of an
incoming message) that it has arrived at the next oor from the environment.
Proof by induction on jk   mj: Let jk   mj = 1. If k = m + 1, then X
1
=
freq(m+1); up(m)g, and the elevator is moving upwards. Since by assumption, up(x)
leads to recvMsg[arrAt(x+1)], the message arrAt(m+1) will be received. This triggers
r
5
and leads to X
2
= fat(k)g. Likewise, if k = m 1, i.e. X
1
= freq(m 1); down(m)g,
the elevator is moving downwards. After some time the event arrAt(m   1) will be
signalled. This triggers r
5
, and leads to X
2
= fat(k)g.
Now assume that the specication is correct for jk mj = n  1, and let jk mj =
n+ 1. If k > m, we have X
1
= freq(k); up(m)g, and the elevator is moving upwards.
After some time the event arrAt(m+ 1) is signalled, triggering r
3
, and yielding X
2
=
freq(k); up(m + 1)g. By the induction hypothesis, since jk   (m + 1)j = n, this leads
to X
n+2
= fat(k)g. An analogous argument holds for k < m. 2
4.3 Example: Communicating Elevators
In the communicating elevator scenario, we assume that two elevators a and b operate
in the same shaft and must not collide. For simplicity, we shall consider the case with
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three oors. Elevator a serves oors 1 and 2, while elevator b serves oors 2 and 3, and
hence the critical zone is oor 2. The states of the elevators are described by means of
the indexical uents at(x), up(x), and down(x), i.e. indexical predicates representing
the information that the resp. elevator is currently halting at oor x, moving upwards
from oor x, or moving downwards from oor x.
In addition to perception events, L
PEvt
= freqTo(x); arrAt(x)g, we now also have
communication events in order to avoid collisions and deadlocks. The elevators use
two communication acts for coordination: requesting the permission to approach, and
granting the permission, expressed by L
CEvt
= freqPerm; grPermg. A special uent
turn(x) controls whose turn it is when both want to go to oor 2 at the same time.
We assume that initially turn(a) holds for both elevators. This leads to the following
specication, including a coordination protocol.
The behavior of elevator a is specied by the rules a
1
; : : : ; a
10
, while that of elevator
b is specied by the dual rules b
1
; : : : ; b
10
. If a is at(1) and receives a request to serve
oor 2, it records the service request, and asks b for permission to go to oor 2; likewise
if b is at(3), and receives a request to serve oor 2:
a
1
: sendMsg[reqPerm; b]; req(2)  recvMsg[reqTo(2)]; at(1) ^ :req(2)
b
1
: sendMsg[reqPerm; a]; req(2)  recvMsg[reqTo(2)]; at(3) ^ :req(2)
If a receives a request from b to give permission for oor 2, and a is at(1) and has not
itself received a request to serve oor 2, or a moves down from oor 2, it grants the
requested permission; likewise, in the case of b:
a
2
: sendMsg[grPerm; b]  recvMsg[reqPerm; b]; (at(1) ^ :req(2)) _ down(2)
b
2
: sendMsg[grPerm; a]  recvMsg[reqPerm; a]; (at(3) ^ :req(2)) _ up(2)
If a receives a request from b to give permission for oor 2, and a is at(1) and has itself
received a request to serve oor 2, but it is b's turn, it grants the permission to b and
changes the turn uent so that in the next competition for oor 2 it will be a's turn
(and dually for b):
a
3
: sendMsg[grPerm; b]; turn(a) ^ :turn(b)
 recvMsg[reqPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2) ^ turn(b)
b
3
: sendMsg[grPerm; a]; turn(b) ^ :turn(a)
 recvMsg[reqPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2) ^ turn(a)
If a receives a request from b to give permission for oor 2, and a is at(1) and has itself
received a request to serve oor 2, and it is indeed a's turn, it records the request in
order to keep in mind that it has to be answered later on (when leaving the critical
zone), and it changes the turn uent:
a
4
: permreq(b) ^ turn(b) ^ :turn(a)
 recvMsg[reqPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2) ^ turn(a)
b
4
: permreq(a) ^ turn(a) ^ :turn(b)
 recvMsg[reqPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2) ^ turn(b)
If a is at(2) or moving up from 1 to 2 when requested for permission, it is not able to
grant permission but only to record the request for a later answer:
a
5
: permreq(b)  recvMsg[reqPerm; b]; at(2) _ up(1)
b
5
: permreq(a)  recvMsg[reqPerm; a]; at(2) _ down(3)
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If a is granted the permission by b to go to 2 when at(1) with a pending service request
req(2), it moves up:
a
6
: do(mvup); up(1) ^ :at(1)  recvMsg[grPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2)
b
6
: do(mvdown); down(3) ^ :at(3)  recvMsg[grPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2)
If a or b receives a service request when at(2), it can immediately depart:
a
7
: do(mvdown); req(1) ^ down(2) ^ :at(2)  recvMsg[reqTo(1)]; at(2)
b
7
: do(mvup); req(3) ^ up(2) ^ :at(2)  recvMsg[req(3)]; at(2)
If a or b receives a service request when at(2), while there is a pending permission
request, it grants permission:
a
8
: sendMsg[grPerm; b]; :permreq(b)  recvMsg[req(1)]; at(2) ^ permreq(b)
b
8
: sendMsg[grPerm; a]; :permreq(a)  recvMsg[reqTo(3)]; at(2) ^ permreq(a)
Finally, if a or b has reached the oor for which it has a pending service request, it
halts and updates its KB accordingly:
a
9
; b
9
: do(halt); at(x) ^ :req(x) ^ :up(x  1)
 recvMsg[arrAt(x)]; req(x) ^ up(x  1)
a
10
; b
10
: do(halt); at(x) ^ :req(x) ^ :down(x+ 1)
 recvMsg[arrAt(x)]; req(x) ^ down(x+ 1)
In order to guarantee fairness of the system, we have to assume that whenever one of
the elevators is at(2) there will eventually be a request causing it to depart from oor
2. This could be achieved by appropriate timeouts, for instance.
4.4 Incomplete and Inconsistent Information
In all elevator examples we have tacitly used the knowledge system A of relational
databases. This was sucient for the simple forms of elevator knowledge where we do
not have to deal with incomplete information. The following example illustrates the
use of SL-factbases for domains where incomplete and inconsistent information has to
be processed.
We show how the possible dierence in the epistemic weight between a piece of
information conveyed by inter-agent communication, and one obtained through per-
ception may be captured in a SL-factbase. While the former is balanced against other
incompatible information, the latter overrides incompatible information. The follow-
ing rules express the epistemic reactions to the communication event tell and to the
perception event observed :
r
1
: F :Sender  recvMsg[tell(F ); Sender ]
r
2
: F :vision  recvMsg[observed(F ); vision ]
We consider the following scenario. There are three agents: 007, his British secretary
(s), and special agent Cooper (C). Cooper considers 007 as a pretty consistent liar, and
consequently assigns a negative reliability degree to him: (007) =  0:5. 007 knows
that both his secretary and Cooper are truthful and very reliable, and consequently
14
a1
: sM[reqPerm; b]; req(2)  rM[reqTo(2)]; at(1) ^ :req(2)
b
1
: sM[reqPerm; a]; req(2)  rM[reqTo(2)]; at(3) ^ :req(2)
a
2
: sM[grPerm; b]  rM[reqPerm; b]; (at(1) ^ :req(2)) _ down(2)
b
2
: sM[grPerm; a]  rM[reqPerm; a]; (at(3) ^ :req(2)) _ up(2)
a
3
: sM[grPerm; b]; turn(a) ^ :turn(b)  rM[reqPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2) ^ turn(b)
b
3
: sM[grPerm; a]; turn(b) ^ :turn(a)  rM[reqPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2) ^ turn(a)
a
4
: permreq(b) ^ turn(b) ^ :turn(a)  rM[reqPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2) ^ turn(a)
b
4
: permreq(a) ^ turn(a) ^ :turn(b)  rM[reqPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2) ^ turn(b)
a
5
: permreq(b)  rM[reqPerm; b]; at(2) _ up(1)
b
5
: permreq(a)  rM[reqPerm; a]; at(2) _ down(3)
a
6
: do(mvup); up(1) ^ :at(1)  rM[grPerm; b]; at(1) ^ req(2)
b
6
: do(mvdown); down(3) ^ :at(3)  rM[grPerm; a]; at(3) ^ req(2)
a
7
: do(mvdown); req(1) ^ down(2) ^ :at(2)  rM[reqTo(1)]; at(2)
b
7
: do(mvup); req(3) ^ up(2) ^ :at(2)  rM[req(3)]; at(2)
a
8
: sM[grPerm; b]; :permreq(b)  rM[req(1)]; at(2) ^ permreq(b)
b
8
: sM[grPerm; a]; :permreq(a)  rM[reqTo(3)]; at(2) ^ permreq(a)
a
9
; b
9
: do(halt); at(x) ^ :req(x) ^ :up(x  1)
 rM[arrAt(x)]; req(x) ^ up(x  1)
a
10
; b
10
: do(halt); at(x) ^ :req(x) ^ :down(x+ 1)
 rM[arrAt(x)]; req(x) ^ down(x+ 1)
Table 1: Two elevators in a shaft.
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assigns (C) = (s) = 0:9. Both Cooper and 007 consider their visual perceptions as
completely reliable: (vision) = 1.
Being busy with the dicult `Yale shooting problem', Cooper is is told by 007 that
the turkey (t) is dead, leading to the following update of Coopers initial knowledge
base X
0
C
= ;:
X
1
C
= Upd(X
0
C
; dead (t) : 007) = fdead (t) : 007g;
Initially, Cooper does not know whether the turkey is dead, i.e. Ans(X
0
C
; dead (t)) =
unknown, but now, since he reckons with the fact that 007 frequently lies, he beliefs
that the turkey is probably not dead:
Ans(X
1
C
; dead (t)) = yes :  0:5
And indeed, Cooper manages the same day to observe the turkey near the main uni-
versity building and updates his KB accordingly:
X
2
C
= Upd(X
1
C
;:dead (t) : vision) = f:dead (t)g
Ans(X
2
C
; dead (t)) = no
Meanwhile 007 has been told by his secretary that the turkey is dead:
X
1
007
= Upd(;; dead (t) : s) = fdead (t) : sg
Ans(X
1
007
; dead (t)) = yes : 0:9
But then special agent Cooper tells him that the turkey is alive which leads to an
implicit neutralization:
X
2
007
= Upd(X
1
007
;:dead (t) : C) = fdead (t) : s; :dead(t) : Cg
Ans(X
2
007
; dead (t)) = yes-and-no : 0:9
since both his secretary and Cooper have the same credibility for him.
This concludes our discussion of reasoning with incomplete and possibly inconsis-
tent information. We now dene the formal concept of a reagent, i.e. a purely reactive
vivid agent.
5 Specication, Execution and Verication of Reagents
In our model, a reagent A = hX;EQ;RRi on the basis of a knowledge system K =
hL
KB
; `; L
Query
; Upd; L
Input
i, and event and action languages L
PEvt
, L
CEvt
, and L
Act
consists of
(X) a knowledge base X 2 L
KB
,
(EQ) an event queue EQ being a list of instantiated event expressions from L
0
Evt
, and
(RR) a set RR  (L
CEvt
[ L
Act
) L
Input
 L
Evt
 L
Query
of reaction rules, consisting
of epistemic and physical reaction and interaction rules which code the reactive
and communicative behavior of the agent.
8
8
We assume that RR is a consistent encoding of reactive behavior in the sense that whenever a set
of reaction rules is triggered by an event, the resulting actions are compatible with each other, i.e. the
epistemic eects associated with them do not cancel out each other.
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A multi-reagent system (MRS) is a tuple of reagents:
S = hA
1
; : : : ;A
n
i
The state of a reagent A
i
consists of its knowledge state X
i
and its event queue EQ
i
,
i.e. it is a pair A
i
= hX
i
; EQ
i
i. The global state S of a MRS is the corresponding tuple
of agent states: S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i.
We use the Prolog style list notation for event queues: EQ = ["jRestQ ], where
the head of the list, " = head (EQ), denotes the current event, and RestQ = tail (EQ)
denotes the tail of EQ. We write EQ
1
+EQ
2
for the concatenation of EQ
1
and EQ
2
,
and EQ+ " instead of EQ+ ["].
5.1 Operational Semantics of Reaction Rules
The operational semantics of reaction rules
E  rM["(U); S]; C
do[(V )]; E  rM["(U); S]; C
sM[(V ); R]; E  rM["(U); S]; C
where U and V are suitable lists of parameters, and rM (and sM) abbreviate sendMsg
(and recvMsg), is dened in two steps. First, it has to be dened how reaction rules
are triggered by events leading to a set of corresponding action rules (without an event
condition). Then, it has to be dened how such a set of action rules is executed, i.e.
how it changes the system state.
The concurrent execution of a consistent set of action rules A in the knowledge
state X yields the update
A(X) = Upd(X; fE : (E  C) 2
_
A & X ` Cg)
where
_
A = f _r : r 2 Ag, and  is any substitution instantiating all free variables of
C. In addition, we need the set of all communication events created by a set of action
rules A which are applicable in X, and addressed to agent j
CE
j
(A;X) = f(V ) : (sM[(V ); R]; E  C) 2 A & X ` C & R = jg
We can now dene the concurrent execution of a set of actions by agent A
i
as the
application of the corresponding set of action rules A to the MRS state hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i
at component i:
A(i; hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i) = hA
0
1
; : : : ; A
0
n
i
where
A
0
i
= hA(X
i
); EQ
i
+ CE
i
(A;X
i
)i
A
0
j
= hX
j
; EQ
j
+ CE
j
(A;X
i
)i (j 6= i)
We assume here that the set of concurrent communication events resulting from a
reaction is serializable in the sense that the order of their arrival at an event queue
does not matter. If A is a singleton, A = frg, we simply write r(i; hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i) instead
of A(i; hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i).
17
Given a set of reaction rules RR, the set of action rules triggered by the event
h"(u); si is denoted RR
"(u);s
, where
RR
"(u);s
= fA;E  C : (A;E  rM["(U); S]; C) 2 RR
& u = U
0
&  = 
0
[ fS=sgg
and A stands for a physical or communicative action, i.e. A = do[(V )], or A =
sM[(V ); R]. Referring to a specic agent i with reaction rule set RR
i
, we write
RR
Evt
i
instead of (RR
i
)
Evt
.
Finally, the concurrent execution of all reactions of agent i triggered by an event
Evt = h"(u); si corresponds to a transition of S, denoted React(i; S), which is given
by the application of the set of action rules RR
Evt
i
at component i:
React(i; S) = React(i; h: : : ; hX
i
; [EvtjRestQ ]i; : : :i)
= RR
Evt
i
(i; h: : : ; hX
i
; RestQi; : : :i)
In the case of a single-reagent system A, with state A = hX;EQi, we omit subscripts
and simply write React(A).
Example 3 In the reactive elevator example above, the reactive behavior is specied
by RR = fr
1
; : : : ; r
5
g, yielding the following transitions:
React(fat(3)g; [reqTo(5)]) = hRR
req(5)
(fat(3)g); []i
= h _r
1
(fat(3)g); []i = hfreq(5); up(3)g; []i
React(freq(5); up(3)g; [arrAt(4)]) = hRR
arrAt(4)
(freq(5); up(3)g); []i
= h _r
3
(freq(5); up(3)g); []i = hfreq(5); up(4)g; []i
React(freq(5); up(4)g; [arrAt(5)]) = hRR
arrAt(5)
(freq(5); up(4)g); []i
= h _r
5
(freq(5); up(4)g); []i = hfat(5)g; []i
5.2 Dening the Execution of Reagents by Meta-Programming
Kowalski, in [Kow95], has proposed to use the formalism of meta-logic programming to
dene \the observation-thought-action cycle of an agent that combines the ability to
perform resource-bounded reasoning, which can be interrupted and resumed any time,
with the ability to act when it is necessary". We make use of several of Kowalski's
suggestions, in particular his inferability meta-predicate demo, and his update meta-
predicate assimilate, from [Kow79]. Notice, however, that in our treatment these meta-
predicates are based on our knowledge system concepts, allowing for various degrees
of expressiveness and various kinds of logical inference, and are therefore more general
than in Kowalski's proposal. While the treatment of actions in [Kow95] is based on
the event calculus of [KS86], we propose the more operational formalism of action and
reaction rules.
We propose the following cycle procedure as a Prolog-style meta-logic specication
of a reagent:
cycle( KB)
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 newEvent( Evt),
ndall( ActE, (reaction(ActE,Evt,Cond), demo(KB,Cond)), ActEs),
perform( ActEs, KB, KB
0
),
cycle( KB
0
).
perform( [], KB, KB).
perform( [Act/E j ActEs], KB, KB
0
)
 execute( Act),
assimilate( E, KB, KB1),
perform( ActEs, KB1, KB
0
).
execute( noAct). % EPISTEMIC ACTION = only assimilate
execute( do(Act)) % PHYSICAL ACTION
 call( Act).
execute( send(Msg,To)) % COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
 pvm send( To, 1, Msg). % implemented in PVM-Prolog
The reactive behavior of each agent is specied by a set of reaction rules represented
as triples hAct=E ;Evt ;Cond i in the table reaction. An incoming event message Evt
is popped from the message queue, and subsequently matched with suitable reaction
rules. If the precondition Cond of a rule matching Evt holds in the current knowledge
state, expressed by demo( KB, Cond), the epistemic eect E associated with the
action Act is assimilated into the knowledge base, the physical or communicative action
Act is performed by means of appropriate procedure calls, and cycle starts over with the
updated knowledge base KB
0
. The demo and assimilate meta-predicates are formally
dened on the basis of our knowledge system concepts of inference and update:
demo(KB;Cond ) :() KB ` Cond
assimilate(E ;KB;KB
0
) :() KB
0
= Upd(KB;E )
5.3 Reagent Systems as Transition Systems
Assuming the principle of nondeterministic interleaving of (possibly concurrent) state
changing events, the temporal behavior of a MRS can be described by means of a
labelled transition system, where we have two kinds of transitions transforming a state
S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i with A
i
= hX
i
; EQ
i
i:
(Perception) An incoming message " representing a perception event from perception
subsystem j, and received by agent i, yields the transition S
i;";j
 ! S
0
, where
S
0
= S, except that EQ
0
i
= EQ
i
+ h"; ji.
(Reaction) A reaction of agent i in response to an event Evt = head (EQ
i
) yields the
transition S
i;RR
Evt
i
 ! S
0
, where S
0
= React(i; S). If the only applicable reaction
rule of the triggered rule set RR
Evt
i
is r, we simply write S
i;r
 ! S
0
.
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Notice that we assume that all transitions are atomic. That is, once an agent is
getting involved in a transition, other agents cannot inuence the transition or observe
intermediate points of it. In combination with the interleaving principle this implies
that the simultaneous execution of actions is serializable in the following sense: if two
elementary actions, say 
1
and 
2
are executed concurrently, then the net eect is
either that of 
1
followed by 
2
, or 
2
followed by 
1
. The gain of the interleaving
assumption consists in the reduction of the number of possible execution histories to
consider in correctness proofs. In general, however, there may be agent programs which
cannot be serialized.
Denition 3 (Execution History) An execution history of a MRS S is a chain
of state transitions S
0

0
 ! S
1

1
 ! : : :, where each 
i
corresponds to one of the tran-
sitions listed above. A history can be nite or innite. By denition, a nite history
ends in a state. The set of all histories of S is denoted by Hist(S).
The states S
i
are linearly ordered in a history H 2 Hist(S). We write S 2 H if S
occurs in H, i.e. if S = S
i
for some i  0. We write S  S
0
, if S = S
i
, S
0
= S
j
, and
i  j.
Denition 4 (Enabled Reagent) We say that a reagent A
i
is enabled if its event
queue is nonempty, EQ
i
6= [].
Denition 5 (Fairness) A nite history of a multi-reagent system S is called fair,
9
if in its nal state no reagent is enabled. An innite history H of S is called fair, if
for all reagents A
i
, either H contains an innite number of A
i
-reaction transitions, or
it contains an innite number of states where A
i
is not enabled.
We denote the set of all fair histories of S by FHist(S).
5.4 Assertional Reasoning
Assertional reasoning about multi-agent systems allows to specify and prove safety and
progress properties of such systems. As concurrent systems, multi-agent systems are
much more complex, and harder to understand, than sequential programs. We show
that the method of assertional reasoning, originally developed for sequential programs
by Floyd, Hoare, and Dijkstra, can be used to analyze the dynamics of multi-agent
systems.
Denition 6 (S-Queries) Let S be a MRS, and let L
0
= fB
i
F : F 2 L
Query
g [
frM
i
["] : " 2 L
Evt
g. Then, L
SQ
= L
0
(:;^;_) denotes the set of S-query formulas.
Inference for S-queries on the basis of a state S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
n
i with A
i
= hX
i
; EQ
i
i,
is dened as follows.
S ` B
i
F i X
i
` F
S ` :B
i
F i X
i
6` F
S ` rM
i
["] i " = head (EQ
i
)
S ` :rM
i
["] i " 6= head (EQ
i
)
9
This is sometimes also called weak fairness as opposed to a stronger notion of fairness which we
shall not consider.
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Denition 7 (Hoare Triples) Let  be a transition of S, and let ;  2 L
0
SQ
be
S-queries. A Hoare triple has the form fg , and the following meaning: for any
state S, if S ` , then (S) `  , where (S) is the state obtained by applying the
transition  to S.
In order to be able to prove correctness assertions with respect to a behavior speci-
cation, we dene two operators Inv, and ;, which represent a fragment of temporal
logic.
10
Assertions about multi-reagent systems refer only to fair histories.
Denition 8 (Invariance and Leads-To Assertions) Let H 2 Hist(S), and let
;  2 L
0
SQ
. We say that H satises the invariance assertion Inv(), symbolically
H j= Inv(), i for all S 2 H, S ` . We say that H satises the leads-to assertion
 ;  , symbolically H j=  ;  , if for all states S 2 H with S ` , there is a later
state S
0
2 H, S  S
0
, such that S
0
`  . An assertion  is entailed by S, symbolically
S j= , if for all fair histories H 2 FHist(S), H j= .
Denition 9 (Multi-Reagent Domain Description) A multi-reagent domain de-
scription consists of a MRS specication S, and a set of assertions  expressing as-
sumptions about the environment of the agents. Such a domain description entails an
assertion , if  is satised by all fair histories of S satisfying . Formally,
S; j=  :() for all H 2 FHist(S), if H j= , then H j= .
We briey state the soundness of several basic proof rules for assertional reasoning.
Claim 1 (INV) Let S be a MRS, such that S
0
= hA
0
1
; : : : ; A
0
n
i, with initial states
A
0
i
= hX
0
i
; EQ
0
i
i. Then, S j= Inv(), if S
0
` , and for every transition  of S, it
holds that fg.
Claim 2 (LT1) S j= ;  , if fg holds for every transition  of S.
Further proof rules, such as the following, allow to infer leads-to assertions from other
assertions:
(Transitivity)
;  ;  
;  
(Left-Or)
;   ; 
 _  ; 
For a comprehensive discussion of such rules, see [MP92].
The following rule for proving leads-to assertions by wellfounded iteration of other
proof rules is also well-known from the literature.
11
Claim 3 (LT2) Let hW;<i be a wellfounded ordering. Then, S j= ;  , if
(i) S j= ;  _ (m) for some m 2W
(ii) S j= (m);  _ (n) for some n < m
10
See [MP92], where 2 corresponds to Inv(), and 2(  3 ) corresponds to ;  .
11
See, e.g., [Sha93].
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5.5 Examples of Verication
Suppose we want to prove that the single elevator system A from 4.1, with A
0
=
hX
0
; EQ
0
i = hfat(m)g; []i, never attempts to move downwards from the ground oor.
This safety property can be expressed by the following invariance assertion.
Observation 1 A j= Inv(:down(0)).
Proof: Obviously, A
0
` :down(0). It remains to show for every reaction rule r
i
(i = 1; : : : ; 5), that :down(0) fr
i
g:down(0). Since A ` :down(0) i down(0) 62 X, we
have to show that down(0) 62 X implies down(0) 62 r
i
(X). This is obvious for r
1
, r
3
,
and r
5
, since these transitions do not add any information about down. Suppose that
down(0) 2 r
2
(X), implying that for some x,
A ` rM[reqTo(x)] ^ x < 0 ^ x > 0
which is a contradiction. Finally, suppose that down(0) 2 r
4
(X), implying that
A ` rM[arrAt(0)] ^ 0 > 0
which is again a contradiction. 2
The progress property that the elevator when currently halting at oor m will
eventually serve every request is expressed by req(k) ^ at(m) ; at(k). Since this is
trivially the case for k = m, we only have to prove it for k < m and k > m. In both
cases the elevator will start to move towards the requested oor, either downwards or
upwards, and it is therefore sucient to prove the following property.
Observation 2 A; j= req(k) ^ (up(m) _ down(m)); at(k).
Proof: We consider only the case of moving down. For k < m, it follows from
 = fup(k); rM[at(k + 1)]; down(k); rM[at(k   1)] g
A; j= req(k) ^ down(m); at(k) _ down(m  1)
A; j= down(m); at(k) _ down(m  1)
by the proof rule (LT2) that A; j= req(k) ^ down(m); at(k). 2
In order to prove correctness properties of the two-elevator system S, we need the
following observation about the possible states of an elevator:
S j= Inv[(B
a
at(1)jB
a
up(1)jB
a
at(2)jB
a
down(2)) ^ :B
a
up(2) ^ :B
a
at(3) ^ :B
a
down(3)]
A dual version of this observation holds for elevator b. By the exclusive disjunction
B
a
at(1)jB
a
up(1)jB
a
at(2)jB
a
down(2), describing the denite state of elevator a, we can
infer, for instance, that X
k
a
` :up(1) ^:at(2) if X
k
a
` at(1) _ down(2), where k is any
stage in the execution history of S. .
We might want to prove mutual exclusion for the communicating elevators system,
i.e. the safety property that it is never the case that the lower elevator goes up to the
second oor, or is currently halting at the second oor, while the upper one goes down
to the second oor, or is currently halting at the second oor, expressed as follows.
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Observation 3 S j= Inv( [(B
a
up(1) _ B
a
at(2)) ^ (B
b
down(3) _ B
b
at(2))])
Proof: According to the proof rule (INV) we have to show that for every fair history
H = hS
0
; S
1
; S
2
; : : :i, where S
i
= hA
i
a
; A
i
b
i with A
i
j
= hX
i
j
; EQ
i
j
i, it holds that for
F = (:B
a
up(1) ^ :B
a
at(2)) _ (:B
b
down(3) ^ :B
b
at(2))
we have S
0
` F , and S
k+1
` F if S
k
` F . Notice that S
k
` F i X
k
a
` F
a
or X
k
b
` F
b
,
where F
a
= :up(1) ^ :at(2), and F
b
= :down(3) ^ :at(2).
It is easy to see that X
0
a
` F
a
, and consequently S
0
` F . We assume now that
S
k
` F , i.e. X
k
a
` F
a
or X
k
b
` F
b
.
Case A: X
k
a
` F
a
, implyingX
k
a
` at(1)jdown(2). Since a perception transition does
not change the beliefs of an agent, it is sucient to consider reactions only.
Case Aa: X
k
a
` at(1). The possible reactions are a
1
, a
2
, a
3
, a
4
, and a
6
. For
any i = 1; 2; 3; 4, and S
k
a
i
 ! S
k+1
, it holds that X
k+1
a
` at(1), and consequently
X
k+1
a
` F
a
. For S
k
a
6
 ! S
k+1
, we obtain X
k+1
` at(1) or X
k+1
` up(1). The former
implies again thatX
k+1
` F
a
, and so it remains to check the latter case which may arise
in three ways: X
k+1
` up(1) i S
k
` rM
a
[grPerm; b] i S
k 1
b
2
 ! S
k
or S
k 1
b
3
 ! S
k
or S
k 1
b
7
;b
8
 ! S
k
.
Case Aa1: If S
k 1
b
2
 ! S
k
, then X
k
b
` at(3) _ up(2), and consequently X
k+1
b
` F
b
.
Case Aa2: If S
k 1
b
3
 ! S
k
, then X
k
b
` at(3), and consequently X
k+1
b
` F
b
.
Case Aa3: If S
k 1
b
7
;b
8
 ! S
k
, then X
k
b
` up(2), and consequently X
k+1
b
` F
b
.
Case Ab: X
k
a
` down(2) entailing the possible reactions a
2
and a
10
. If S
k
a
2
 ! S
k+1
,
then X
k+1
a
` down(2), and consequently X
k+1
a
` F
a
. If S
k
a
10
 ! S
k+1
, then X
k+1
a
`
at(1), and consequently X
k+1
a
` F
a
.
Case B: X
k
b
` F
b
, implying X
k
b
` at(3)jup(2). The proof of case B is dually
analogous to case A. 2
Observation 4 Also we might want to prove for x = a; b that
S; j= rM
x
[reqTo(2)]; B
x
at(2)
expressing the progress property that both elevators will eventually serve every request
from oor 2. Here we need the following environment assumptions:
 = fB
a
up(1); rM
a
[arrAt(2)]; B
b
up(2); rM
b
[arrAt(3)]g
[ fB
a
down(2); rM
a
[arrAt(1)]; B
b
down(3); rM
b
[arrAt(2)]g
guaranteeing that the environment correctly informs the elevator about its arrival at
every oor. Notice that the fairness assumption implies that whenever one of the
elevators is halting at the critical oor, it will eventually depart, requiring that S; j=
B
a
at(2); rM
a
[reqTo(1)], and S; j= B
b
at(2); rM
b
[reqTo(3)].
6 Vivid Agents
While reagents are only able to react in response to perception and communication
events, full agents can in addition generate and execute plans in order to solve certain
tasks assigned at design time, or communicated at run-time.
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6.1 Planning
We distinguish between normal and permanent tasks, both of which require planning.
While normal tasks exist only temporarily until they have been carried out, permanent
tasks persist and have to be re-solved over and over again. Tasks are initially assigned
to an agent at design time, or communicated to it at run-time.
In order to solve a task G 2 L
0
Query
, in a situation described by X
0
2 L
KB
,
an agent generates a suitable plan P being a sequence of instantiated action rules
r
1
(~c
1
); : : : ; r
n
(~c
n
), such that when the corresponding sequence of actions is performed
in X
0
, it leads to a situation P (X
0
) 2 L
KB
where G holds:
P = r
n
(~c
n
)  : : :  r
1
(~c
1
) ; and P (X
0
) ` G
where P is applied to X
0
as a composed function.
Example 4 (The Planning Elevator) Let the action rules r
u
and r
d
represent
the elevator actions oneup and onedown from example 2, and let the current situation
be described by X
0
= fat(3)g. If the elevator has to perform the task at(7) in order
to pick up a passenger at the seventh oor, it could generate the following (admittedly
not very exciting, but optimal) plan:
P = r
u
(6)  r
u
(5)  r
u
(4)  r
u
(3)
the execution of which solves the task:
P (X
0
) = r
u
(6)(r
u
(5)(r
u
(4)(r
u
(3)(fat(3)g)))) = fat(7)g
Notice that our concept of planning on the basis of action rules in knowledge systems
can be viewed as a generalization of the STRIPS paradigm.
12
Therefore, the frame
problem is solved in the same way as in STRIPS: by means of a minimal change policy
incorporated in the update operation of a knowledge system.
6.2 Specication of Vivid Agents
In this section, we dene our concept of a vivid agent which extends that of a reagent
by adding tasks and intentions, and allowing for planning and plan execution.
On the basis of a knowledge systemK = hL
KB
; `; L
Query
; Upd; L
Input
i, and event
and action languages L
PEvt
, L
CEvt
, and L
Act
, a vivid agent is specied as a 4-tuple
A = hM;EQ;AR;RRi, consisting of
(M) a mental state M = hX;TL;PTL;CI i, comprising
(a) a knowledge base X 2 L
KB
representing its beliefs,
(b) a set of tasks TL  L
0
Query
the agent has accepted to carry out, and a set of
permanent tasks PTL  L
0
Query
which have to be checked and carried out
continuously,
(c) a set of current intentions, i.e. goal/plan pairs, CI = fG
1
=P
1
; : : : ; G
n
=P
n
g,
where P
i
2 AR

is a plan to achieve G
i
2 L
0
Query
;
12
The STRIPS system of [FN71] corresponds to planning on the basis of A, the knowledge system
of relational databases.
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(EQ) an event queue EQ recording perception events, i.e. EQ is a sequence of elements
from L
0
PEvt
,
(AR) a set AR of action rules describing the available action types which together with
the task lists TL and PTL and the current intentions CI are the basis for the
proactive behavior (i.e. deliberative planning and plan execution), and
(RR) a set RR of reaction rules encoding the reactive and communicative behavior.
We extend the query and the input language of the underlying knowledge system
in order to allow also for queries and inputs concerning the tasks and the current
intentions of an agent.
Denition 10 (Mental Queries) Let F 2 L
Query
. The mental query language
L
MQ
is dened as the smallest superset of L
Query
containing TF , PTF , and IF , and
being closed with respect to formula formation under :, ^, and _.
Inference for mental queries on the basis of a mental state M = hX;TL;PTL;CI i is
dened as follows:
M ` F i X ` F
M ` TF (PTF ) i F 2 TL (F 2 PTL)
M ` :TF (:PTF ) i F 62 TL (F 62 PTL)
M ` IG i G=P 2 CI for some plan P
M ` :IG i there is no P , s.th. G=P 2 CI
Denition 11 (Mental Inputs) Let F 2 L
Query
. The mental input language L
MI
is dened as the smallest superset of L
Input
containing TF , :TF , PTF , :PTF , and
:IF , and being closed with respect to formula formation under ^.
Updating with mental inputs concerns beliefs, tasks, and intentions. While tasks
can be added and retracted through mental input, current intentions, which arise
internally through goal selection and planning, can only be dropped but not added.
Let F 2 L
Input
, and G 2 L
Query
. Then,
Upd(M;F ) = hUpd(X;F );TL;PTL;CI i
Upd(M;TG) = hX;TL +G;PTL;CI i
Upd(M;:TG) = hX;TL  G;PTL;CI i
Upd(M;PTG) = hX;TL;PTL+G;CI i
Upd(M;:PTG) = hX;TL;PTL G;CI i
Upd(M;:IG) = hX;TL;PTL;CI  G=P i
where TL G, PTL G, and CI  G=P , i.e. the result of adding/retracting G from
the resp. set, is dened in the obvious way. We can now extend the form of action
and reaction rules by allowing for mental queries as preconditions, and mental inputs
as the eects of actions and reactions. Thus, action rules AR correspond to 3-tuples,
and reaction rules RR to 4-tuples of the following form
AR  (L
Act
[ L
CEvt
) L
MI
 L
MQ
RR  (L
Act
[ L
CEvt
) L
MI
 L
Evt
 L
MQ
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The triple hTL;PTL;CI i is called intentional state. The agent state consist of the
mental state and the event queue of the agent, i.e. it is a pair hM;EQi.
In the next sections, we shall show that agent specications hM;EQ;AR;RRi are
directly executable.
6.3 Dening the Execution of Vivid Agents by Meta-Programming
We propose the following cycle procedure as a Prolog-style meta-logic specication of
a vivid agent interpreter:
cycle([ KB, [], PTL, [] ]) % PLANNING for permanent tasks
 newEvent( noEvt)
member( G, PTL),
not demo( KB, G), % check if goal is not satised
plan( P, KB, G), % generate a plan for it
cycle([ KB, [], PTL, [G/P] ]).
cycle([ KB, [G j RestTL], PTL, [] ]) % PLANNING for temporary tasks
 newEvent( noEvt)
not demo( KB, G), % check if goal is not satised
plan( P, KB, G), % generate a plan for it
cycle([ KB, [RestTL], PTL, [G/P] ]).
cycle([ KB, TL, PTL, [G/[R] j RestCI] ]) % EXECUTING the last action of a plan
 newEvent( noEvt)
action( R, Act, E, Cond), % `R' is the action rule name.
demo( KB, Cond),
epistemic assimilate( E, KB, KB
0
),
execute( Act),
cycle([ KB
0
, TL, PTL, RestCI ]).
cycle([ KB, TL, PTL, [G/[RjRestP] j RestCI] ]) % PLAN EXECUTION
 newEvent( noEvt)
action( R, Act, E, Cond), % `R' is the action rule name.
demo( KB, Cond),
epistemic assimilate( E, KB, KB
0
),
execute( Act),
cycle([ KB
0
, TL, PTL, [G/RestPjRestCI] ]).
cycle([ KB, TL, PTL, [G/[RjRestP] j RestCI] ]) % REPLANNING
 newEvent( noEvt)
action( R, Act, E, Cond),
not demo( KB, Cond),
plan( P, KB, Cond),
append( P, [RjRestP], NewPlan),
cycle([ KB, TL, [G/NewPlanjRestCI] ]).
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Notice that the above ve cycle clauses for planning, plan execution and re-planning
only apply if there is no event in the event queue. If there is an event, the following
cycle clauses dene the reactive behavior of the agent like in the case of reagents except
that reactions now may aect the entire mental state of an agent which was conned
to beliefs in the case of reagents.
cycle( M)
 newEvent( Evt),
ndall( ActE, (reaction(ActE,Evt,Cond), demo(M,Cond)), ActEs),
perform( ActEs, M, M
0
),
cycle( M
0
).
perform( [], M, M). % all reactions performed
perform( [Act/E j ActEs], M, M
0
)
 execute( Act),
assimilate( E, M, M1),
perform( ActEs, M1, M
0
).
The rst ve cycle clauses (planning and plan execution) are responsible for the proac-
tive behavior of the agent. Plans are generated in order to solve tasks. If all events
have been processed, and the current plan is nonempty (i.e. there are still planned ac-
tions not yet performed), plan execution is invoked. For simplicity, we do not consider
the case where no plan can be found, and where the agent is therefore not able to
achieve its goals.
If all events have been processed, and the current plan is empty (i.e. it has been
fully executed), planning starts (i.e. there is time now for deliberation). This leads to
the construction of a new plan to be added to the list of current intentions.
Notice that this high-level specication is not committed to a particular planning
mechanism. It only supposes that there is a meta-predicate plan(P;KB; G) expressing
that P is a plan to achieve goal G on the basis of KB. For real-time behavior, there
should be some mechanism to interrupt planning in a logically controlled way whenever
new events, requiring timely reaction, happen.
6.4 Multi-Agent Systems as Transition Systems
A closed multi-agent system S is a tuple of agents:
S = hA
1
; : : : ;A
m
i
The state of agent A
i
is denoted by A
i
= hM
i
; EQ
i
i. The global state S of a multi-
agent system S is the corresponding tuple of agent states: S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
m
i.
The application of a set of action rules A to the mental state M yields the update
A(M) = Upd(M; fE : E  C 2
_
A & M ` Cg)
where
_
A = f _r : r 2 Ag. Likewise, we dene the set CE
j
(A;M) of all communication
events created by a set of action rules A applicable in M and addressed to agent j in
the same way as for reagents (see 5.1). We can then dene the concurrent execution
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of a set of actions by agent A
i
as the application of the resp. set of action rules A to
the multi-agent system state S at component i:
A(i; hA
1
; : : : ; A
m
i) = hA
0
1
; : : : ; A
0
m
i
where
A
0
i
= hA(M
i
); EQ
i
+ CE
i
(A;M
i
)i
A
0
j
= hM
j
; EQ
j
+ CE
j
(A;M
i
)i (j 6= i)
If A is a singleton, A = frg, we again simply write r(i; S) instead of A(i; S).
Denition 12 (Act) When agent i executes a planned action from its current in-
tentions, we obtain the following transition:
Act(i; S) = Act(i; hA
1
; : : : ; hX
i
;TL
i
; [G=P jRestCI
i
]; EQ
i
i; : : : ; A
m
i)
= r(i; hA
1
; : : : ; hX
i
;TL
i
; [G=tail(P )jRestCI
i
]; EQ
i
i; : : : ; A
m
i)
if tail(P ) 6= [], otherwise
Act(i; S) = r(i; hA
1
; : : : ; hX
i
;TL
i
; RestCI
i
; EQ
i
i; : : : ; A
m
i)
where r = head (P ).
Finally, the concurrent execution of all reactions of agent i triggered by an event
Evt = h"(u); si corresponds to a transition of S, denoted React(i; S), which is given
by the application of the set of action rules RR
Evt
i
at component i.
Denition 13 (React)
React(i; S) = React(i; hA
1
; : : : ; hM
i
; [EvtjRestQ ]i; : : : ; A
m
i)
= RR
Evt
i
(i; hA
1
; : : : ; hM
i
; RestQi; : : : ; A
m
i)
Example 5 In the communicating elevator scenario, where S = hA
1
;A
2
i, if the
initial agent states are A
0
1
= hfat(1)g; [reqTo(2)]i, resp. A
0
2
= hfat(2)g; [reqTo(3)]i,
and the reaction rules are RR
1
= fa
1
; : : : ; a
10
g, resp. RR
2
= fb
1
; : : : ; b
10
g, we obtain
the following transitions:
React(1; S
0
) = RR
req(2)
1
(1; hhfat(1)g; []i; hfat(2)g; [req(3)]ii
= hha
1
(fat(1)g); []i; hfat(2)g; [reqTo(3); reqPerm]ii
= hhfat(1); req(2)g; []i; hfat(2)g; [reqTo(3); reqPerm]ii
React(2; S
0
) = RR
req(3)
2
(2; hhfat(1)g; [req(2)]i; hfat(2)g; []ii
= hhfat(1)g); [reqTo(2)]i; hb
6
(fat(2)g); []ii
= hhfat(1)g); [reqTo(2)]i; hfreq(3); up(2)g); []ii
S
1
= React(1; React(2; S
0
)) = React(2; React(1; S
0
))
= hhfat(1); req(2)g); []i; hfreq(3); up(2)g); [reqPerm]ii
S
2
= React(2; S
1
)
= hhfat(1); req(2)g); [grPerm]i; hfreq(3); up(2)g); []ii
S
3
= React(1; S
2
)
= hhfup(1); req(2)g); []i; hfreq(3); up(2)g); []ii
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We assume that up(x) leads in nite time to recvMsg[arrAt(x + 1)], and therefore
elevator a will receive the message arrAt(2), and elevator b will receive arrAt(3), i.e.
S
4
= hhfup(1); req(2)g); [arrAt(2)]i; hfreq(3); up(2)g); [arrAt(3)]ii
S
5
= React(1; React(2; S
4
))
= hhfat(2)g); []i; hfat(3)g); []ii
Assuming the principle of nondeterministic interleaving of (possibly concurrent) state
changing events, the temporal behavior of a multi-agent system can be described by
means of a labelled transition system. In contrast to reagent systems, we now have ve
kinds of transitions transforming a multi-agent system state S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
m
i with
A
i
= hM
i
; EQ
i
i, and M
i
= hX
i
;TL
i
;PTL
i
;CI
i
i:
(Perception) An incoming event message " at agent i yields the transition S
i;"
 ! S
0
,
where S
0
= S, except that for A
i
, EQ
0
i
= EQ
i
+ ".
(Reaction) A reaction of agent i in response to an event " = head (EQ
i
) yields the
transition S
i;RR
"
i
 ! S
0
, where S
0
= React(i; S).
(Action) If there is G=P 2 CI
i
, such that the planned action r = head (P ) is ex-
ecutable, i.e. M
i
` Cond (r), this yields the transition S
i;r
+
 ! S
0
, where S
0
=
Act(i; S).
(Replanning) If none of the current intentions is executable, and G=P = head (CI
i
)
with r = head(P ), re-planning yields the transition S
i;r
 
 ! S
0
, where S
0
= S,
except that CI
0
i
= G=P
0
+ tail(CI
i
) such that P
0
= N + P , if there is a plan
N 2 AR

i
such that N(M
i
) ` Cond (r), or otherwise CI
0
i
= tail(CI
i
), i.e. the
unachievable goal G is being dropped from the set of current intentions.
(Planning) Planning by agent i either a) for a goal G = head (TL
i
), or otherwise b), if
TL
i
= [], for some G 2 PTL
i
such that M
i
6` G, yields the transition S
pl(i;G)
 ! S
0
,
where S
0
= S, except that CI
0
i
= [G=P ] + CI
i
such that P is a plan to achieve
G, i.e. P (M
i
) ` G, and in case a), TL
0
i
= tail(TL
i
).
Typically, one would give priority to perception and reaction over action and planning,
i.e. a simple control policy would only allow to execute a planned action, if there is
no event requiring a reaction, and it would only allow to generate a new plan if the
current intentions have all been carried out, i.e. CI = [], or cannot be executed, i.e. for
all G=P in CI , head (P ) is not executable. There may be reasons, however, to suspend
reactions in certain cases in favor of urgent actions (this topic is out of scope of the
present paper).
Denition 14 (Execution History) An execution history of a multi-agent sys-
tem is a chain of state transitions S
0

0
 ! S
1

1
 ! : : :, where each 
i
corresponds to one
of the transitions listed above. A history can be nite or innite. By denition, a nite
history ends in a state. The set of all histories of a multi-agent system S is denoted
by Hist(S).
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For multi-agent system histories, we need the notion of fairness.
Denition 15 (Enabled Agent) We say that an agent A
i
is enabled if its event
queue EQ
i
, its list of current intentions CI
i
, or its task list TL
i
is nonempty, or if
one of its permanent tasks has to be (re-)solved: for some G 2 PTL
i
: X
i
6` G.
Denition 16 (Fairness)
1. A nite history of a multi-agent system S is called fair, if in its nal state no
agent is enabled.
2. An innite history H of S is called fair, if for all agents A
i
, either H contains
an innite number of non-perception transitions of A
i
, or it contains an innite
number of states where A
i
is not enabled.
We shall denote the set of all fair histories of S by FHist(S).
6.5 Assertional Reasoning
Denition 17 (S-Queries) Let S be a multi-agent system, and let L
0
= fB
i
F :
F 2 L
Query
g [ fT
i
F : F 2 L
Query
g [ fPT
i
F : F 2 L
Query
g [ frM
i
["] : " 2 L
Evt
g. Then,
L
SQ
= L
0
(:;^;_), i.e. the Boolean closure of L
0
, denotes the set of S-query formulas.
Inference for S-queries on the basis of a state S = hA
1
; : : : ; A
m
i with A
i
= hM
i
; EQ
i
i,
and M
i
= hX
i
;TL
i
;PTL
i
; P
i
i, is dened as follows:
S ` B
i
F i X
i
` F
S ` T
i
F i F 2 TL
i
S ` PT
i
F i F 2 PTL
i
S ` rM
i
["] i " = head (EQ
i
)
and nally S ` : i S 6` , and S `  ^ (_) i S `  and (or) S `  .
As for reagent systems, we get the analogous notion of Hoare triples fg , invari-
ance assertions Inv(), leads-to assertions  ;  , and domain descriptions S; also
for multi-agent systems.
7 Related Work
Although we depart considerably from it, our present work has been much inspired by
Shoham's [Sho93] proposal of agent-oriented programming (AOP). Our reaction rules
may be compared with Shoham's commitment rules, and our action rules with capa-
bility rules. The major dierences seem to be that 1) our work is based on our theory
of knowledge systems (allowing for negation-as-failure in the query language, and for
various forms of updating, including deletion/contraction), while Shoham's AGENT-0
system is dened on the basis of temporal fact knowledge using a kind of standard
logical inference and recency-preferring revision of facts; 2) there is no genuine concept
of actions in Shoham's AOP, actions are simply represented as facts, and therefore
conditional action statements in AOP are not able to account for the epistemic eects
of an action which is, on the other hand, essential in our account of actions; 3) AOP
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is much more ambitious about temporal reasoning using appropriate modalities, and
it uses a system clock for synchronization purposes, while our communication acts are
realized by asynchronous message passing.
In [Woo92], Wooldridge has dened a formal model of a multi-agent system along
the same lines we have followed. Instead of a knowledge system in our sense, he uses
the `deduction model of belief' from [Kon86], and extends it by adding a belief revision
function corresponding to the update operation of our knowledge systems. His action
rules correspond to our epistemic action rules, and his message rules correspond to
our communicative action rules. However, perception and reaction are not explicitly
considered. Also, the mental state of an agent in this model consists only of beliefs,
and since there is no consideration of goals, or tasks, the agent model does not account
for planning and plan execution. Wooldridge presents an interleaved execution model
for his multi-agent system model, but he does not dene fairness conditions for it. In
subsequent work, [Woo95], Wooldridge rened and extended his model and linked the
execution histories of a multi-agent system to a dense time line in order to use the
temporal logic of reals for specication and assertional reasoning.
In [FW94], a rst-order temporal logic-based programming system, Concurrent
MetateM, is proposed for the purpose of specication and verication. It is shown
how to specify and reason about the Contract Net Protocol. The program rules of this
formalism have some similarity with our action rules, but there is no explicit concept
of events and event-triggered rules.
Gelfond et al. (see [GL92], or more recently [BGP95]) have proposed an action do-
main description language which allows to represent a) three kinds of facts describing
in addition to the basic propositional knowledge which is timestamped by situation
names also knowledge about the occurrence of actions and about the precedence of
situations, and b) epistemic action rules which are called causal eect laws. A domain
description can be queried about the validity of timestamped facts, and about the hy-
pothetical eects of actions. Gelfond et al. suggest to use their formalism \in designing
intelligent agents capable of planning in a changing environment". Their approach is
more general than ours with respect to the explicit use of situation names, and its
possibility to record not only state knowledge but also the occurrence of actions. In
other respects, however, it is less powerful: 1) while in our modelling of agents any
knowledge system may be used, they restrict state knowledge to literal sentences, and
thus, the epistemic eects of actions cannot be uncertain or indenite; 2) our approach
accounts for the interplay of perception, reaction, planning, and plan execution, while
they only consider planning and plan execution; 3) they only consider the single-agent
scenario without communication, whereas we account for multi-agent scenarios with
inter-agent communication. In addition, we outline methods of assertional reasoning
for agent systems which allow to prove the correctness of a specication with respect
to safety and progress properties.
Our framework of assertional reasoning for multi-agent systems is a generalization
of the approach of [Sha93] for concurrent systems based on the temporal logic concepts
of Hoare [Hoa69], and Manna and Pnueli [MP92]. Since in the theory of concurrent
systems, knowledge states consist of the values of state variables, there is no considera-
tion of more complex states such as those of knowledge bases and the related concepts
of inference and update. While the system model of [Sha93] contains only one kind
of state changing event, corresponding to assignment statements, we have to consider
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ve kinds of transitions in order to take into account all relevant state changes of a
multi-agent system: perception, reaction, planning, plan execution, and re-planning.
Liveness and fairness properties for multi-agent systems were dened in an abstract
automata-theoretic setting in [Bur93]. Execution histories are treated as elements
of a formal language (being a prex-closed subset of the set of all nite sequences
of events/actions). While this approach abstracts away from the internal structure
and cognitive operations of agents, our work is primarily concerned with this internal
structure from the conceptual and programming point of view.
There is a large body of rather abstract work on multi-modal logics modeling the
mental attitudes of agents in the tradition of Hintikka's possible worlds semantics
for knowledge and belief.
13
The connection of this work to the operational concepts
needed in the design and implementation of agents is not clear, however. In [RG93], for
instance, Rao and George propose to use three-dimensional modal logics, called BDI
logics, for the specication and verication of `abstract agent-oriented systems'. These
logics, however, lack genuine concepts of action and reaction. Thus, by being not able
to account for the interplay of perception, reaction and action, they are rather limited,
although, by means of their three-dimensional possible worlds semantics, they are very
complex.
14
Specications in these logics are completely abstract and, as opposed to
our specication formalism, not executable. Verication, however, is rather important
for executable, and not for abstract specications. Finally, by lacking a concept of
communication, BDI logics cannot model multi-agent systems.
Rao [1996] concedes that BDI logics \have shed very little light on the practical
problems". As an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice of BDI
agents, he proposes a logic-programming-like language, called AgentSpeak(L), which
allows to specify a certain type of reagents whose KB is a set of literals upon which
classical inference is performed (i.e. there is no form of the CWA). What Rao calls a
`plan', is rather a specic form of a reaction rule (which may be viewed as a pre-dened
plan to react made up at design time). AgentSpeak(L) does, in fact, not allow planning
and pro-active plan execution. Similar to our semantic account of vivid agents, Rao
denes a transition system semantics for his AgentSpeak(L) reagents.
In recent years, `hybrid' agent architectures combining reactive and deliberative
behavior have become increasingly important (see, e.g., [BS92, BHS93, Mue94]). This
indicates that, in practice, neither the traditional purely deliberative logic-based ap-
proaches, nor the more recently fashionable purely reactive approaches are appropriate
for the design and validation of agent systems. Our proposal of vivid agents with action
and reaction rules provides a theoretical foundation for such hybrid architectures. In
fact, [Mue94] uses a certain form of action rules, called pattern of interaction, and an
action-rule-based update operation, called mechanism execution function, in outlining
the formal model of the hybrid architecture InteRRap. In [BHS93], an architecture
for representing and executing communication protocols in multi-agent systems is pro-
posed. However, no suggestion is made how to integrate communication with query
answering and updating in a logical way, and no formalism for proving the correctness
of protocols is presented.
13
See, e.g., [Wer88, CL90, RG91, Sin94].
14
\Hence, the implemented BDI systems have tended to use the three major attitudes [Be-
lief,Desire,Intention] as data structures, rather than as modal operators."[Rao96]
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8 Open Issues and Limitations
Several issues had to be left open. First, we did not consider the possibility of simul-
taneous actions in planning. Second, we did not say which planning procedures (e.g.
partial order planning, abstraction, etc.) would be appropriate for vivid agents. Third,
we did not consider the possible unability of an agent to nd a plan for a specic goal.
Fourth, we had to omit the question how to distinguish important events (for which it
is urgent to react adequately) from less important ones. Fifth, we did not show how
sophisticated forms of communication can be achieved by vivid agents in accordance
with speech act theory. All these issues are orthogonal to the points of our paper; they
are treated elsewhere, and may be incorporated in our approach.
More signicant, however, is the lack of a method to interrupt planning when new
events call for timely reaction. A possible solution of this problem, where (re)action
execution and planning are performed concurrently, is proposed in [SW96].
9 Conclusion
The concept of vivid agents is a powerful extension of the concept of knowledge bases.
It combines static knowledge in the form of a declarative knowledge base with dynamic
knowledge in the form of action and reaction rules. As a rule-based approach, it is
more `computational' than modal logic approaches based on possible worlds semantics.
We have shown how to model deliberative, pro-active, reactive and communicative
behavior in this framework. We also outlined methods of assertional reasoning for
vivid agent systems which may allow to prove safety and progress properties for critical
applications.
A rst case study [SW97] shows that the concept of vivid agents can be successfully
applied to practical problems. A programming language for vivid agent systems, called
VIVA, is currently being developed and implemented [Wag96b].
We hope that our agent model can serve as a basis for the formalization of further
high-level concepts such as values, emotions, social structures, social laws, etc., which
will be the topic of our future research.
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